Hamas built its digital fundraising on a simple assumption: that cryptocurrency, encrypted chats, and a constantly rotating set of wallet addresses would keep the money — and the donors — invisible. The Justice Department just demonstrated, in detail, how wrong that assumption was. Federal agents seized more than $560,000 in crypto headed for the terrorist group, took control of its main fundraising website, and walked away with a list of thousands of people who tried to send it money.
This was not luck, and it was not a single lucky grab. Investigators spent more than a year working the trail. Three court-authorized warrants, dated March, June, and October of 2025, let the FBI capture the funds. Kash Patel’s agents used human sources to identify the wallets tied to the operation, then followed the money as Hamas shuffled it through a rotating collection of addresses distributed over an encrypted group chat and a fundraising site — the very obfuscation meant to make the cash untraceable became the thread investigators pulled.
The FBI’s Albuquerque field office also seized the domains and servers running AlQassam.ps, the main website of Hamas’ military wing. Controlling that infrastructure did more than shut a page down; it let agents intercept donations that supporters were still trying to send, in real time. U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro’s message to the group was blunt: their networks are not secure, their crypto is vulnerable, and the effort to dismantle their capacity to wage war will not stop.
The strategic value here isn’t the half-million dollars, welcome as that is. It’s the donor list. Thousands of people reached out online trying to bankroll a group responsible for the October 7 massacre, and DOJ says that information is now feeding future counterterrorism investigations. Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Eisenberg tied the operation directly to October 7, framing the seizures as a way to deprive Hamas of the money it uses to recruit, radicalize, and finance attacks. Every name on that list is a lead.
This also wasn’t the first strike. In March 2025, DOJ seized roughly $201,400 tied to Hamas fundraising addresses that had already laundered more than $1.5 million since the previous October. Court filings described the mechanics: an encrypted group chat feeding supporters a shifting list of at least 17 addresses, donations funneled into an operational wallet and then washed through exchanges and over-the-counter brokers. FBI affidavits trace Hamas’ crypto fundraising experiments back to early 2019, complete with instructions coaching donors on how to stay anonymous.
Hamas tried to hide its money online. We found it.
$560,000+ in cryptocurrency seized. Hamas websites and servers taken down.
We will use every tool at our disposal to cut off terrorist financing and disrupt Hamas wherever it operates—including in cyberspace. https://t.co/WJ4DKyEPJg pic.twitter.com/x5xzlCNGvx
— US Attorney Pirro (@USAttyPirro) September 1, 2026
They stayed anonymous right up until they didn’t. U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Jeanine Pirro put it this way:
A message to Hamas: We will stop your fundraising for terror. Your networks are not secure, your crypto is vulnerable, and we will not stop until your ability to wage war is defeated.
There is a broader lesson worth naming. For years the assumption on the terror-financing side was that digital currency had opened a lane the U.S. government couldn’t police. This operation is a straightforward rebuttal: the ledger is permanent, the sources are findable, and patience beats obfuscation. Hamas picked cryptocurrency because it believed no one was watching. Someone was, the whole time. Congrats, Director Patel, to you and your agency. Good work.
