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We Just Learned Chilling New Information About the Attempt on Trump’s Life In Pennsylvania

GOVERNMENT

Okay, fair warning. This will make your blood boil, especially if you’re a dyed-in-the-wool MAGA supporters.

While Thomas Crooks was perched on a rooftop 155 yards from Donald Trump with a rifle, taking aim at a man who would become President of the United States again — a Secret Service counter-drone operator whose entire job was to prevent exactly this kind of threat was typing a search query into Google.

Not radioing local law enforcement. Not alerting the protective detail. Not doing any of the dozens of things a trained federal agent is supposed to do when a suspicious man with a weapon is spotted on a rooftop overlooking a presidential rally. Googling. The location of the building. That local law enforcement had already called in. Two minutes earlier.

Corey Comperatore is dead because of what happened in Butler, Pennsylvania that day. A retired volunteer fire chief who threw himself over his wife and daughter to shield them from the gunfire didn’t make it home. Two other men were gravely wounded. Donald Trump took a bullet to the ear and survived by a fraction of an inch. And now, nearly two years later, a Department of Homeland Security inspector general report has confirmed what many Americans already suspected: the security failure in Butler wasn’t just bad luck. It was a cascade of inexcusable, preventable, jaw-dropping incompetence at every single level.

Local law enforcement spotted Crooks on the roof at 6:09 p.m. and called it in immediately. The counter-drone operator, instead of picking up the radio and asking where the AGR building was, opened a web browser. He was still searching when Crooks fired his first shot at 6:11 p.m. Two minutes. That’s all it took for a complete breakdown in communication to nearly cost America its 47th president.

And it gets worse. A Secret Service site agent had already proposed a simple, common-sense solution — use trucks already on the grounds to block the line of sight from the AGR building to the stage. Campaign staff rejected it because the vehicles would interfere with the camera shot. The aesthetic concerns of a campaign press operation overruled a basic security measure at a presidential rally. And then the agreed-upon alternative was never actually implemented. Supervisors were told local law enforcement would handle the AGR complex. Nobody followed up. Nobody checked. Nobody made sure the gap was covered.

The lead agent on the ground, Miyo Perez, was by the report’s own admission relatively inexperienced for an assignment of this magnitude. That alone should have triggered alarm bells at every level of Secret Service leadership. It didn’t. And here’s the part that should make every American’s blood boil: the two supervisors who oversaw her planning, who signed off on a security arrangement that left the future president exposed to a clear line of fire from an unsecured rooftop, faced zero discipline. They were promoted. The man who ultimately approved the Butler security plan, Sean Curran, is currently the Director of the United States Secret Service.

Read that again. The man whose agency produced one of the most catastrophic protective failures in American history is now running the agency.

Multiple agents were suspended without pay in the aftermath of Butler — but suspensions without pay are not accountability. Not when a man is dead. Not when two others nearly died. Not when the President of the United States had to wipe his own blood off his face in front of 50,000 people and an audience of millions.

The American people deserve to know that the individuals responsible for this failure have faced real, permanent consequences — and so far, the evidence suggests they largely have not.