On Tuesday, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling that significantly expands the federal government’s authority to detain migrants without bond. The court held that even migrants arrested within the United States—well away from any port of entry—can be subject to mandatory detention.
In the case of Herrera Avila v. Bondi, the court adopted a broad interpretation of federal immigration law, effectively eliminating the long-standing distinction between migrants stopped at the border and those residing in the interior of the country.
? BREAKING: The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals has OVERTURNED an activist judge’s ruling that PREVENTED ICE from holding illegals without bond during deportation proceedings
This is a HUGE win for ICE and deportations ?
SEND THEM ALL BACK! pic.twitter.com/ldL9UPJycI
— Nick Sortor (@nicksortor) March 25, 2026
Joaquin Herrera Avila entered the United States illegally in 2006 and again in 2016. He was arrested during a traffic stop in 2025 and subsequently placed in removal proceedings, where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained him without bond. After an immigration judge denied his request for a bond hearing, Avila filed a habeas petition seeking either his release or a hearing under § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
The district court granted Avila’s request, concluding that the mandatory detention provision in § 1225(b)(2)(A) did not apply to him because he was not actively “seeking admission” and that applying this provision to interior arrests would conflict with § 1226(c). The district court ordered the government to either release him or provide a bond hearing. Following this decision, Avila was released on bond, and the government subsequently appealed.
The 8th Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, ruling that any noncitizen in the United States without lawful admission is subject to mandatory detention without bond as per 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The appeals ruling closely examines the statutory language and ultimately hinged on whether an “applicant for admission” is also an alien who is “seeking admission.” The court explained:
If the phrases are equivalent, then, generally, any “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted” “shall be detained.” 2 Id. § 1225(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). On the other hand, if the phrases are not equivalent, then an alien is only subject to detention under§ 1225(b)(2)(A) if he or she is present in the country without being admitted and also engages in a separate act of “seeking admission,” whatever that may be.
Ultimately, the court reached the same conclusion as the 5th Circuit did in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, which adopted a broad interpretation of the statutory provisions. This interpretation rejects the distinction between migrants who are stopped at the border and those arrested in the interior of the country. Under this emerging framework, the crucial factor is not where a migrant is encountered, but whether they were ever lawfully admitted to the United States. This represents a significant shift, dramatically expanding the reach of mandatory detention nationwide.
In contrast, the 7th Circuit recently expressed some skepticism regarding this interpretation in the case of Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, although it did not directly address the issue in its ruling.
Regardless, it is likely that this matter will soon be presented to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, this ruling is a notable development in immigration law and a victory for the administration’s enforcement efforts.
